So i wrote this research paper for some class i took last semester. I picked the topic myself, because i have always been interested in exploring the issue of corruption and economic development in Africa. It really bothers me... why the rich seem to get richer, and the poor just seem to live off the left-overs of the rich elite in Africa. Its disgusting. The paper is on corruption in Nigeria. I titled it 'Corruption in Nigeria : A man-made tragedy', because that's exactly how i feel about the situation (and the professor did not want us to take a stance..only present what's out there). I picked Naija because the resources were easier to find. I would like to do one on Ghana soon. I expect it to be very interesting. ... This discussion is far from over..expect more.
Introduction
The international press has portrayed Nigeria as a State in crisis. Ethnic and religious sectionalism, series of bloody riots and local unrest, recurrent military coups, economic turmoil, and the re-imposition of the Islamic criminal code in northern states paint a picture of utter chaos. Within Nigeria’s litany of problems, its notorious corruption is prominent. Most of its developmental, economic and social problems are attributed to the rampant corruption in the country. Nigeria often tops Transparency International’s list of most corrupt countries (Pierce 888). In a social and political context, the Webster Dictionary defines corruption can be defined as anti-social behavior that grant improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms. Usually corruption subverts or diminishes the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide for the wellbeing of all members of the society in a just and equitable manner (Osoba 27). At present, Nigeria is facing acute problems of development: a neglect of citizenship education and rapid growth in negative developments such as an increase in crime, mass poverty, rising stagflation, a widening unequal distribution of wealth, capital flight and brain drain.
Although one country cannot truly represent an entire continent, Nigeria is like a typical African country in many respects (Umez 2). First, it endured colonial rule like other African countries, with few exceptions such as Ethiopia and Liberia. Secondly, it achieved political independence from Britain around the same time most other African countries did. Third, it is one of the most diverse countries in Africa and has ethnic groupings speaking over two hundred and fifty languages. Furthermore, it is still searching for a new identity as a nation state (Umez 2). Meaning, it is faced with the task of bringing together into one nation a variety of different people with different ethnic groupings and languages. Since Nigeria represents twenty five percent of Sub-Saharan Africa, the problem with Nigeria is also viewed as the problem with Africa (Pierce 887).
Nigeria achieved political independence from Britain on October 1, 1960. The country relies a lot on its oil reserves for economic growth. Considering the ambitions and promises of the nationalists who fought for independence, the autonomy to manage its affairs, and its oil reserves, experts predicted a promising future for Nigeria (Pierce 889). As a matter of fact, by the late 1970s oil had boomed, with revenues of $29 billion a year (Umez 4). There was a civil war, the Biafran war, between 1967 and 1970. Yet even during that period of instability the economy remained strong and the currency fairly stable. The country became one of the greatest economic powers among black African countries and became known as the “Giant of Africa” (Umez 4). Conversely, Nigeria’s economy began to weaken in the early 1980s, and the boom was replaced by economic, social and political decline.
Why did this national decline occur? Why did Nigeria miss the opportunity to excel, considering its wealth in crude oil reserves? Furthermore, Nigeria has gone through a series of interchanges between civilian and military rule and none of them have been able to solve the country’s problems, neither have they been able to formulate effective policies to deals with these issues. There are four dominant arguments that recur frequently in any debate about the problems of Nigeria: the colonial legacy perspective, the democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective, the corrupt leadership perspective and the value system perspective. These arguments suggest that corrupt practices are a contingent product of social structures rather than the result of some kind of African or Nigerian dysfunction. Corruption lies at the heart of this discourse no matter how one looks at it.
Colonial Legacy Perspective
This argument blames Nigeria’s problem of development on the impact of the lasting effects of colonialism. It is important to note that this perspective is given as an explanation to the reason why Africa as a continent is plagued with developmental issues. Here Nigeria fulfils a stereotype. Experts who support this argument are of the view that the colonial masters established the boundaries of African countries haphazardly. This forced together traditional warring ethnic groups and people of different histories, cultures, and languages (Madiebo 3, Pierce 892). In addition, they exploited Africa’s valuable minerals for the development of their home countries (Osoba 60).
The substance of this argument is that the colonial masters arbitrarily created borders of Africa with little or no regard for the differences among ethnic groups. Bedford Umez noted a quote from Wole Soyinka in his book The Tragedy of a Value System in Nigeria, “One hundred years ago at the Berlin Conference the colonial powers that ruled Africa met to divvy up their interests into states, lumping various peoples and tribes together in some places, or slicing them apart in others like some demented tailor who paid no attention to the fabric, color or pattern of quilt he was patching together.” Due to this disorganized creation of boundaries, Nigeria, just like many other African countries, consists of different ethnic groups who were, at worst, traditional enemies. These boundaries also split up families. Little effort was made to promote understanding and tolerance between the new neighbors. Consequently, the country lacks unity, which is quintessential for solving national problems, and hence development (Madiebo 3).
Nigeria began independence under a constitution that divided the country into three major regions: North, West and East, made up of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, predominant ethnic groups respectively (Madiebo 3). Each region had its unique culture and language, and was governed by a party representing the majority of the people in that region. This arrangement was unsuccessful because each party in the separate regions governed their region as if it was a separate country. Each regional government struggled for more power in industry and commerce, and ethnic rivalries erupted between the regions. Alexander Madiebo best summarizes this argument in his book The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War:
The federation of Nigeria, as it exists today, has never really been one homogeneous country, for its widely differing peoples and tribes are yet to find a basis for true unity. This unfortunate yet obvious fact notwithstanding, he former colonial master had to keep the country one, in order to effectively control his vital economic interests concentrated mainly in the more advanced and “politically unreliable” South. Thus, for administrative convenience, Northern and Southern Nigeria because amalgamated in 1914. Thereafter the only thing these people had in common became the name of their country. That alone was an insufficient basis for thorough unity. As a result, there was division, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced disparity in development among various peoples of the country (Madiebo 3).
The country has had a series of inter-ethnic conflicts, as well as religious ones due to differences in ethnic groups. In 1967, there was ethno-religious violence between the Igbo Christians and the Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Eastern and Northern Nigeria. This conflict resulted in the migration of the Igbo people back to the East (Umez 12). The most prominent conflict is the Biafran war, which occurred between 1967 and 1970. It involved an attempted secession of the southeastern provinces in Nigeria as the self-proclaimed Republic of Biafra. The military governor of the Igbo-dominated South-East, Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, citing the Northern massacres and electoral fraud, proclaim the secession of the Southeastern part of Nigeria as The Republic of Biafra, an independent nation. Several peace accords were set up to bring stability to the country, the most prominent one being the Aburi Accord held in Ghana, but they all proved futile, and the war began in 1967 (Madiebo 22). Another example, on April 1990, Middle Belt Christian officers, led by Major Gideon Okar, attempted to overthrow Ibrahim Babangida in an unsuccessful coup (Umez 12). As a matter of fact, given the ethnic violence in African countries such as Nigeria and Rwanda, certain scholars think that the solution to this problem will be to redraw the African boundaries.
Another version of an argument that blames the colonial masters for the present demise of Nigeria takes the position that the colonizers did not adequate prepare the colonized to be able to amply govern their country before leaving. The most striking feature of decolonization was the skill and cleverness with which the British colonialists placed themselves in a dominant position over the wealth of Nigeria and its accumulation process (Osoba 17). They did this by developing a spurious power sharing arrangement partnership between themselves and their monopoly enterprises on one hand, and the fledgling Nigerian bourgeoisie on the other (Osoba 17). The British made sure, through a series of constitutional projects beginning from the Richards constitution of 1946 to the Independence constitution of 1960, that the British international bourgeoisie remained the senior partner and their Nigerian counterparts were no more than junior partners (Osoba 17). By progressively transferring legal authority to rule to their Nigerian surrogate elite, the British succeeded in securing their acquiescence in retaining and enhancing the existing structures of accumulation under which foreign monopoly capital dominated all the key aspects of the economy such as manufacturing, banking, shipping, insurance etc. Several key and politically influential members of the Nigerian elite from the three regions received new opportunity for private accumulation. These new roles as political and economic decision makers opened up new opportunities for corruption, and substantial capital accumulation to major members of the Nigerian ruling class, as opposed to the pre-decolonization era where, due to their marginalization in the scheme of things, they had limited access to corrupt accumulation (Osoba 19).
Critique
Most scholars who criticize this argument are of the stance that it is correct to say that ethnic rivalries are part of Nigeria’s problems of development. However, the colonial legacy perspective fails to offer a comprehensive explanation of the central causes of the problem, nor does it provide much guidance for creating effective and lasting policies to deal with those problems. The colonial legacy argument is considering only one form of ethnic conflict, which is inter-ethnic conflict. However, intra-ethnic conflicts such as bigotry and hatred persist in Nigeria, and this perspective does not address that fact (Umez 14). Nigerians from the same ethnic group, only separated by a state boundary, often find it hard to marry others who do not come from the same state origin as them (Umez 13). For example, the Igbo people from Anambra State refuse to the Igbo people from Imo State and vice versa. Furthermore, some sections of Imo State, within the same Igbo ethnic group, with the same language and culture, believe that one community of the same Imo State are worse than snakes. In fact there is a popular phrase within Imo State that if one were confronted with a choice of a citizen from that “outcast” community and a snake, one would spare the snake and kill the citizen (Umez 13). Similarly, there is a group of Hausa people in Kaduna State who are stigmatized as witches or wizards 9Umez 13). Also, there has been a long feud between the Modakeke people and the Ife people of the Yoruba ethnic group over which clan is superior. In 1997, the communities engaged in a bloody fight simply because the local council headquarters was shifted from a section of the town belonging to the Modakekes, who are considered settlers of the town, to an Ife ward (Umez 13). While the feeling of ethnic superiority can be attributed to the haphazard creation of African countries, it does not explain the bigotry and hatred within ethnic groups.
Democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective
The democracy-leads-to-economic growth perspective blames lack of democracy in authoritarian regimes as the cause of Nigeria’s developmental problems. Bedford Umez relates democracy to sovereignty. He explains that sovereignty can reside in one person, or a selected few, or in the whole adult population. Sovereignty in the adult population occurs when the representative government permits and maintains certain basic principles. These principles include universal political participation, political equality, majority rule with substantive recognition of minority rights, rule of law, government responsiveness to public opinion and the basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, religion and organization. According to this argument, the military does not have the ability to perform a developmental role in the economic sphere. Hence, Nigeria must establish democracy first in order to achieve economic growth.
Eric Nordlinger argues that military regimes are usually concerned with advancing their own corporate interests such as military autonomy, salaries, and arms procurement, even when such interests are clearly at odds with the society at large. The military will therefore be more willing to increase its own budget and proportionately reduce the budget of civilian and non-defense projects (Nordlinger 134). Samuel Decalo argues that some factions of the military are self-interested players of a Hobbesian political climate, preoccupied with their own selfish aggrandizement, which tend to retard economic growth (Decalo 23). This would explain why some military officials shamelessly flaunt wealth stolen from the citizens of the country.
Nigeria has been ruled more by the military than civilians, and the nation’s economy has only kept declining (McGowan and Johnson 543). Nigeria is one of the coup prone countries in Africa. Military intervention seems to be an integral part of the electoral cycle in Nigeria (McGowan and Johnson 543). Since independence Nigeria has been ruled by the military for approximately thirty of the forty-nine years of its postcolonial history (McGowan and Johnson 543). Starting with the first coup in 1966, Military intervention has been the primary intervention for changing governments.
| Year | Regime |
| 1960 – 1965 (5 years) | Civilian |
| 1966 – 1978 (13 years) | Military |
| 1979 – 1983 (4 years) | Civilian |
| 1984 – 1998 (15 years) | Military |
| 1999 – 2009 (10 years) | Civilian |
Table 1: Civilian and Military Regimes in Nigeria
A democratic process is preferable to military rule. Compared to military rule, democratic principles when enforced promote economic growth since it provides a more stable environment for investments, both domestic and foreign (Umez 27). Progressive economic performance is better assured with democratically elected civilian leaders than within the military, because business investors are usually reluctant to invest in politically unstable environments (Umez 27). Furthermore, democracy enables people to periodically change their government personnel through elections, and elected officials presumably respond to public opinion in order not be rejected at the poll. Military rule, on the other hand, does not provide such direct mechanisms that allow the citizens to control the military personnel or policies (Umez 27). Another important part of the argument is that in terms of civil rights, the military does not guarantee civil liberties to any citizen, since it usually does not tolerate any opposition (Decalo 23).
Critiques
The major critique of this argument is that some of the attributes assigned to the military, such as pursuit of narrow interests, apply equally to the civilian leaders. Both military and civilian governments pursue their own interests once they achieve power. Self-interest clearly may be at odds with what serves the greater good of the citizens, but neither the military nor civilian government can assure development since they both steal public funds (Ayittey 250). However the civilian government may use less brutal force. Democracy is not self-executing, and therefore cannot automatically lead to economic growth (Umez 27). The fact that the civilian governments between 1960-1966 and 1979-1983 failed in the task of solving developmental problems, just as much as the military governments, is usually used as an example to back this critique. The first civilian government could not keep Nigeria united, and the second one was generally known to be corrupt. Some governors and their accomplices in the democratic government that ruled between 1979 and 1983 buried thousands of public funds in their private homes for private use, while other Nigerian civil servants went on for months without pay (Ayittey 250). Corruption seems to be the underlying issue that must be dealt with before anything else. Democracy is believed to be the best form of governance mainly because its principles are geared towards serving the general public. However, if corrupt, selfish and inconsiderate officials are elected in a democracy, they can easily destroy the economy and democracy itself. Therefore, the success of a democratic government depends on the morally guided leaders and elite who are determined to work for the growth of every aspect of the country (Umez 16).
Corrupt Leadership Perspective
Another argument often made in the literature is one that links Nigeria’s current developmental issues to corrupt leadership and mismanagement. Professor Chinua Achebe, in his book, The Trouble With Nigeria, presents what is perhaps known as the best-known version of the argument:
The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility and to the challenge of personal example, which are the hallmarks of a true leadership (Achebe 1).
Corruption can be seen in every area of the Nigerian government and public service (Diamond 75). The 1988 report of the federal auditor general listed numerous cases of unrepaid loans, payments without vouchers, purchases and reimbursements without receipts, and large losses in stock and cash plus gross abuse of official property (Diamond 75). Both military and civilian regimes have been equally corrupt (Smith 112). Scholars who support this theory simply blame on the failure or inability of leaders to manage and share the country’s wealth equally (Smith 55). They believe Nigeria simply has not found the right leaders, and the reason why the country is failing economically is because these leaders and elite are only seeking their best interests.
Critiques
The critique for this argument is that it does not address the fundamental question, which is, why is it that most of the Nigerian administrators are corrupt? It simply glosses on the issue of bad governance, but does not explain in detail why this is the case. If one accepts Achebe’s assertion that the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership and that there is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character, then one is assuming that the politicians become corrupt once they assume office, and once the corrupt incumbent leadership is removed, the problems will be solved (Umez 20). Furthermore, it does not explain the recurring similarities among Nigerian administrations. It does not explain why an incoming administration, whether civilian or military, tends to be as corrupt as its predecessors (Umez 20).
Another concern expressed about this argument is that one cannot use it as a guide to policy calculus, that is, as a justification for change of government. It has correctly asserted that the major source of the problem of corruption is within the leadership, and implies that the problem will be solved once the leadership is removed. Usually a coup d’état occurs as a prescriptive policy to stop corruption within leadership. However, if the incoming government is going to be equally as corrupt then Nigeria is really not making any useful progress (Umez 20).
Value System Perspective
Scholars who support this theory argue that the single most important entry point to an understanding of Nigeria’s problems is that which comes to grips with the prevalent value system in Nigeria, knowing its dimensions, defining characteristics, typical process of operation, and its implications for the everyday lives of the population. They connect the prevailing value system to individual actions such as corrupt leadership behaviors, and the impact on Nigeria’s problems of development (Umez 24). This position suggests that the Nigerian value system produced at a macro level, a corrupt mass and a corrupt leadership, which ultimately misappropriate funds and create developmental problems. Both the leaders and the led, having been socialized by the prevailing Nigerian value system, generally have the same attitudes to life’s struggle (Umez 20). Both generally believe that corruption is normal, and in some cases necessary part of life, hence the person who does not take advantage of the opportunity will be the one who fails in life. Therefore, there is no reason to expect, all things being equal, a significant change between military and civilian regimes in terms of attitude and approaches towards nation- building in Nigeria (Umez 55). Empirical evidence shows that there is no significant difference between the military and civilian regimes with respect to economic performance (Diamond 76). No simple definition can capture the complex interrelationships and processes operating through time that make up the predominant value system in Nigeria. However, Bedford Umez proposes the most simple definition I have read:
The dominant value system in Nigeria is one that glorifies and endorses corrupt and illegal means as necessary, normal, and sufficient means to ends.
He goes on to say that one can see the defining characteristics of the Nigerian value system by looking at some of the popular household phrases in Nigeria. Some of these are “He who no dey fast, na him go board last”, “dey there and board last”, “na fast guy”, “God-father”, “Long-leg”, “OBT” and “419” (Umez 30). These phrases are written and spoken in colloquial English, but have powerful symbolic significance. They all mean essentially the same thing: to get what one wants, one should use whatever means necessary to get it. For example, “He who no dey fast, na him go board last” means that one is bound to fail or lag behind if one does not give, or accept bribe, or employ some other fraudulent or illegal means to get whatever one wants (Umez 30). “Dey there and board last” means that if someone chooses not to give or accept bribe or embezzle money, or stage a coup, given all the available means at his or her fingertips, then one is a coward and deserves to fall behind (Umez 30). “Fast guys” refer to people who are experts in using illegal and fraudulent means to get what they want. “Fast guys” are usually among those with all the luxuries, and are often among those who are accorded the highest titles and honor in their communities by the uneducated masses (Umez 30). These people can obtain certain things that ordinary people cannot such as exam questions before the exam date, diplomas and certificates without attending any higher institution of learning, and are the ones whose opinions are considered worthwhile due to their wealth (Umez 30).
“OBT” and “419” are names given to people who can obtain anything through trickery (Umez 31). One of the most prominent international symbols of Nigerian corruption is the notorious fraudulent e-mail scams by “419” people (Smith 28). Many people with e-mail accounts in the English-speaking world receive regular messages from Nigerians stating that they are in a position to transfer millions of dollars into the bank accounts of willing foreign collaborators. These are confidence tricks where the writers, usually claiming that they are high government officials, senior military officers, oil industry executives, bank managers, politicians and even widows of dead dictators, attempt to lure the recipients into sending money and bank account information in response to a promise of much larger payoffs (Smith 28). The interesting thing about these scams is that the primary victims are Nigerians, not foreigners.
People with “long-legs” and “God-fathers” are those who have connections in government agencies or private companies and corporations (Umez 31). These individuals not only use their influence and connections to get ahead, they also embezzle public and company money through these same connections and are able to get away with it (Smith 63). Many scholars talk about patronage, “god-fatherism”, and favoritism as a prominent part of Nigerian culture. The patron is also known as the “godfather”. The term ‘son’, ‘brother’, ‘sister’, ‘mother’, ‘daughter’ are used to refer to a wide range of kin relationships (Smith 62). Having one of these in an important government position guarantees access to government contracts. This enables access to specific jobs ranging from refurbishing an oil refinery to building roads or supplying office stationery (Smith 62). One analyst describes the government as a “contractocracy – government of contractors, for contractors, and by contractors” (Othman 452). Due to the country’s increased reliance of oil revenues, with its concomitant concentration on government control over the national cake, social and political contracts as the basis for securing lucrative government contracts became very important (Smith 64). One of the most striking things about corruption when it comes to awarding contracts is that everyone seems to know exactly what is going on (Othman 452). It is important to note that though Nigerians condemn the system of patronage that dominates the allocation of government resources, they feel like they can do nothing about it. One university professor, who was appointed a state commissioner of agriculture, confessed that even if he wanted to avoid the practice of awarding contracts on the basis of favoritism, he could not, because his people (his kinsmen) would call him foolish and selfish (Smith 67). Usually when the masses complain about corruption, they are not complaining about the deed itself, but the fact that the wealth is not being shared (Smith 67).
What are the implications of the prevailing value system in Nigeria? The damaging implications include embezzlement of public funds, abuse of public or company property, “free-rider” mentality, dishonesty and disregard for the law (Umez 43). During the Shagari administration, Nigeria’s foreign reserve decreased from $8 billion in 1979 to $1 billion in 1983. External debt increased from $12 to $15 billion (Umez 42). Furthermore, the ministers, governors and other officials awarded illegal contracts and import licenses, while senators traveled on vacations abroad with public funds, and many politicians transferred public funds from Nigeria to their private bank accounts abroad (Umez 42). In fact, when the military took over, huge sums of cash were seized from the homes of leading politicians and those connected to them (Umez 42). Also, public properties are misused for personal interests because the masses are made to believe that these properties do not belong to anyone; they belong to the government (Umez 42). The “free-rider” mentality refers to people who exhaust every loophole that will guarantee them benefits without working for those benefits (Umez 43). Accordingly, some workers often submit overtime claims for work they did not do, other submit false doctors prescription bills asking for refunds when they in fact did not fall sick (Umez 43). Dishonesty is another damaging consequence. It is normal to find dishonesty from a good number of people born and bred in a society that generally glorifies and endorses tainted practices as necessary and sufficient means to ends (Diamond 73). A good number of Nigerians prefer to do business with foreigners than Nigerians. If a country’s citizens do not trust themselves yet have business relationships with each other, it is hard to expect economic prosperity in such a society (Umez 43). Disobedience of laws is one of the fastest means employed to enrich oneself, and therefore a major component of the prevailing lifestyle in the society (Umez 43). Usually most laws passed in Nigeria end up enriching most of the people entrusted with its enforcement. Some off-duty police officers can set up a checkpoint, unofficially sanctioned, just so they can make extra money. Violators of laws often go through free as long as they offer bribes at the checkpoints (Smith 62). Once a person has money, he or she could easily be above the law (Smith 64). For example many people in Nigeria believe that ex-governors convicted of embezzling public money during the Shagari administration were all pardoned due to their money or influence (the “long-leg”). The Babangida administration granted pardon to five of the former governors who were convicted by the Special Military Tribunal in 1984 (Umez 45).
Moreover, one of the most common manifestations of the predominating value system in Nigeria is the disregard for expert opinions (Umez 46). The leaders, whether military or civilian, clearly understand that expert opinion make a big difference. However they neglect expert opinion because they do not want to bring in people who will change the current value system (Umez 46). Consequently, some educated Nigerians remain abroad instead of returning to Nigeria to put their knowledge to use, since they are frustrated by the current value system, thereby creating brain drain (Umez 46). The prevailing value system creates a vicious system where the value system creates corrupt behaviors, corrupt behaviors create problems of development, and problems of development in turn worsen the value system. To expect the average Nigerian, entrapped in this vicious cycle, to become a saint overnight in the name of leadership is almost impossible (Umez 46). This explains why corruption recurs in leadership in Nigeria, and why the country is plagued with problems with development.
Critique
A lot of scholars seem to agree with the value system perspective. There are others who talk about this perspective in conjunction with some other perspective that I have already discussed above. It seems the value system perspective encompasses elements of other perspectives but offers a more in depth analysis of the causes of corrupt governance. One critique to this argument is that the argument does not explain why there are inter-tribal conflicts in Nigeria, when these conflicts also play a role in slowing the developmental process of the country (Umez 56). Another critique is that corruption is everywhere, not only in Nigeria, hence saying that a value system is the reason why a country is failing assumes that other countries who are not battling developmental issues do not have corrupt people in their countries. Corruption is an English word used to describe a certain act that is universal (Umez 49).
I came across a rebuttal to this critique, which said that though corruption was not a Nigerian word, there were Nigerian equivalents for describing similar acts. Furthermore, though corruption may be everywhere in the world, the leaders and elite of these countries at least invest their stolen money in their country, knowing that this is needed for development. However, corrupt Nigerian officials seem to store their ill-gotten wealth in foreign bank accounts. Hence, even though there may be corruption everywhere, some government officials are more senseless and deceitful than others (Umez 57).
Conclusion
On the topic of Nigeria’s economic and developmental issues, different experts have different views. However they all range within the spectrum of the above mentioned arguments, with some authors offering a combination of the arguments. Corruption is a concept, which appears in all these arguments. This suggests that the issue must be addressed in order to foster developmental growth in the country. Nigerian corruption is a legacy of a long history of politics, state formation, economic exploitation and of a complex interplay of indigenous and foreign understandings of appropriate governmental conduct. In conducting a good study of Nigeria’s problems with development, and solutions thereto, it will be advisable for one to take into consideration all the different perspectives available when it comes to explaining the problem. These will all provide insight as to what solutions could be suggested.
Bibliography
Achebe Chinua. The Trouble with Nigeria. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co., 1983
Diamond Larry. “Political Corruption; Nigeria’s Perennial Struggle.” Journal of democracy. Vol 2. No. 4. Baltimore: John Hopkins university press (Fall 1991) pp.73-84.
Eker Varda. “On the Origins of Corruption; Irregular Incentives in Nigeria. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1. New York: Cambridge university press. (Mar., 1981), pp.173-182.
Ifeka Caroline. “Playing Civil Society Tunes; Corruption and Misunderstanding Nigeria’s ‘Real’ Political Institutions. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89, Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis ltd. State of the Union; Africa in 2001 (Sep., 2001), pp.461-465.
Madiebo Alexander A. The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980
McGrowan Pat and Johnson Thomas. “Six Coups in Thirty Years – Further Evidence Regarding African Military Coup D’etats.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 24, (1986), pp. 1131-1148
Namco, Arthur A. Nigeria: the stolen billions. Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Pub., 2002
Orator, Victor O. Nigeria’s Stumbling Democracy and its Implications for Africa’s Democratic Movement. Westport: Praeger Security International (2008)
Osoba S.O. “Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol.23, No.69 A tribute to A.M. Babu, Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. (Sep 1996), pp. 371-386.
Othman Shehu. “Classes, crisis, and coup: The demise of the Shagari regime.” African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 333. 1984. Pp. 441- 461
Pierce Steven. “Looking like a State: Colonialism and the Discourse of Corruption in Nigeria. Comparative Studies in Society and History,Vol.48, No. 4. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Oct. 1, 2006), pp. 887-914.
Richard Sklar L., Whitaker C.S. African Politics & Problems in Development. Colorado: Lyanne Rienner publishers (1991)
Smith, Daniel J. A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Princeton: Princeton University Press (2007)
Tignor Robert L. “Political Corruption in Nigeria Before Independence.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2. New York: Cambridge university press. ( Jun., 1993), pp. 175-202.
World Peace Foundation. “Nigeria’s Economy”, “Corruption” Governing Nigeria. WDF Report 35. Massachusets: World Peace Foundation (2003)
